Analysis
Israel’s announced decision to recognize the Somaliland region represents far more than an isolated diplomatic gesture. It is part of a broader geopolitical realignment, in which the Horn of Africa ( already weakened by internal conflicts and interstate rivalries) emerges as a new arena for the indirect spillover of Middle Eastern tensions.
The analysis conducted by Aden Omar Abdillahi (Researcher at IEPS-CERD) and Hassan Omar Ahmed (Associate Researcher at IEPS-CERD) highlights a series of systemic effects that go well beyond the question of Somaliland’s status alone. The move constitutes a potential turning point for regional security, African norms of sovereignty, and the strategic architecture of the Red Sea.
Over the past decade, Somalia has followed a trajectory of gradual reconstruction, marked by the consolidation of federal institutions, expanded diplomatic recognition, and the progressive transfer of security responsibilities from international forces to national security institutions.
Within this context, the recognition of a secessionist entity by a major extra-regional actor acts as a structural factor of delegitimization of the federal state. It weakens Mogadishu’s capacity to impose a national framework for resolving territorial disputes and sends a negative signal to international partners: Somali sovereignty becomes negotiable within great power politics.
From a security perspective, this weakening is likely to generate a multiplier effect. Jihadist groups, foremost among them Al-Shabaab, may instrumentalize the decision as evidence of the failure of the Somali state model, reinforcing their narratives of mobilization and ideological legitimation. The Israeli dimension further amplifies this radicalization potential by embedding the crisis within a politico-religious register that can be exploited for recruitment and propaganda.
One of the central contributions of the analysis by Abdillahi and Ahmed lies in their emphasis on the growing internal fragmentation of northern Somalia. Somaliland is no longer a politically homogeneous space. Mogadishu’s recognition of the SSC-Khatumo administration has formalized a territorial reconfiguration that effectively limits Hargeisa’s control over a significant portion of what was formerly considered Somaliland.
In this context, Israeli recognition functions as a catalyst for heightened tensions:
• it hardens the positions of secessionist authorities,
• it radicalizes unionist populations,
• and it increases the likelihood of inter-clan conflicts, transforming a political dispute into an open-ended security dynamic.
This mechanism reflects a classic logic of the “externalization of legitimacy,” whereby external recognition compensates for internal fragility. Historically, however, such configurations tend to generate more violence than stability.
At the regional level, the stakes extend far beyond Somalia. Recognition of Somaliland challenges a central pillar of the post-colonial African order: the principle of uti possidetis juris, which—despite its limitations—has helped contain large-scale fragmentation across the continent.
In a Horn of Africa characterized by:
• structural fragilities within the Ethiopian state,
• Sudan’s ongoing civil war,
• and persistent tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia,
an externally legitimized secessionist precedent creates a demonstration effect. It opens the door to the redefinition of identity-based claims as state-building projects, supported not through negotiated internal processes, but through opportunistic geopolitical alignments.
This dynamic increases the risk of violent state disintegration and promotes the regionalization of conflicts, with increasingly ethno-territorial and militarized fault lines.
One of the most structuring elements of the analysis lies in the linkage between Somaliland’s recognition and Middle Eastern strategic rivalries. The Red Sea, already under pressure due to Houthi operations and the spillover of the Gaza conflict, is becoming an indirect theater for Israeli-Iranian competition and Gulf power rivalries.
In this configuration, any Israeli presence or strategic alignment in northern Somalia potentially turns Somaliland into an indirect target. The issue would no longer be a purely Somali dispute, but a node within a broader geography of confrontation, exposing the region to:
• asymmetric attacks,
• increased militarization of coastal zones,
• and heightened vulnerability of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a vital artery of global trade.
Furthermore, the analysis points to the possible emergence of competing security blocs around the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. Opposite a potential axis associating Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and ( more indirectly) Ethiopia, a counter-bloc could take shape involving Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Djibouti, and other regional partners.
Under such a scenario, Somalia would be compelled to enter into defensive alliance dynamics, not as a result of autonomous strategic choice, but out of necessity to protect its sovereignty. This would mark a significant shift: Somalia would no longer be merely a state in reconstruction, but a strategic node within an expanded regional competition.
Ultimately, while Israeli recognition does not alter Somaliland’s legal status, it profoundly reshapes the strategic environment. It weakens sovereignty norms, increases the risks of state fragmentation, and embeds the Horn of Africa within a logic of indirect confrontation linked to Middle Eastern crises.
As emphasized by Aden Omar Abdillahi and Hassan Omar Ahmed, this initiative appears less as a stabilizing lever than as an accelerator of regional vulnerabilities. In the medium term, it may contribute to transforming the Horn of Africa from a fragile space into a structured zone of confrontation, with cascading effects on maritime security, trade flows, and regional politico-military balances.
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