The UAE’s Shadow Empire in the Horn of Africa

 Transactional Sovereignty and the New Geopolitics of the Horn of Africa

 

Strategic Analysis

By  Al-Aghbari

 

Sovereignty in the Horn of Africa is no longer protected by law alone. Increasingly, it depends on strategic leverage: how many powers need a state, how indispensable its territory is, and how effectively its government can balance competing external interests.

The post-1945 international order was built on the principle that sovereignty and international law could restrain power. That principle was always imperfectly applied, but for small states it provided a diplomatic language and, at times, a measure of protection. In the Horn, that protection has weakened.

The region has become a dense arena of competition involving Gulf states, China, the United States, Turkey, European powers and regional governments. Ports, military facilities, trade corridors and political relationships now carry strategic value far beyond their immediate economic functions.

The United Arab Emirates has emerged as one of the region’s most capable actors at converting capital, infrastructure, logistics, diplomacy and security relationships into strategic influence. Through DP World, infrastructure investment and relationships with governments and non-state actors, Abu Dhabi has developed a network stretching from the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden into Ethiopia and Sudan.

This is not simply a story of external domination. It is the emergence of a *transactional geopolitical order* , in which infrastructure, security and political influence can reinforce one another.

The UAE’s power is therefore best understood not as conventional empire, but as *network power* : the ability to generate strategic leverage without requiring formal territorial control.

 The UAE’s Case for Engagement

Abu Dhabi rejects the characterization of its African engagement as imperial.

In a letter published by the Financial Times on August 17, 2026, Afra Al Hameli, Director of Strategic Communications at the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argued that the UAE’s relationships with African governments are based on sovereign partnerships, investment and mutual benefit. She also criticized portrayals of African states as passive recipients of foreign influence. The letter said the UAE had committed more than $110 billion to African projects between 2019 and 2023, including approximately $70 billion toward renewable energy. Those figures are official UAE claims rather than independently verified estimates. (Financial Times)

This argument deserves to be taken seriously.

African governments have agency. They negotiate agreements, invite investment, seek military cooperation and exploit competition among external powers to advance their own interests. UAE investment in ports, logistics, renewable energy and infrastructure also creates genuine economic assets.

The question, therefore, is not whether Emirati engagement produces benefits. *It does* .

The question is whether economic benefit and strategic dependence can emerge simultaneously.

That is where the Horn becomes instructive.

 Berbera: Ports as Strategic Assets

Berbera is perhaps the clearest example.

DP World obtained a 30-year concession to develop and manage the Port of Berbera and committed up to $442 million to expand and upgrade the facility. It has also developed the Berbera Economic Zone and linked the port to the corridor toward Ethiopia. (DP World)

Commercially, the logic is straightforward. Berbera sits on the Gulf of Aden, close to one of the world’s most important maritime corridors, and can serve Somaliland, Ethiopia and wider Horn markets.

But the strategic significance goes beyond the commercial transaction.

In a region where maritime access is closely connected to national security, ports can become instruments of diplomatic influence, military logistics and regional bargaining. Infrastructure at strategic chokepoints can generate geopolitical options for whoever finances, operates or controls it.

Somaliland actively sought the investment because it needed infrastructure, capital and international partnerships. The project has expanded Berbera’s capacity and increased Somaliland’s international economic visibility.

The strategic question is therefore not whether Somaliland benefits—it does.

It is whether the strategic leverage associated with external control of critical infrastructure is proportionate to those benefits.

That is the central problem of transactional sovereignty: *A government may gain economically while becoming more dependent strategically.* 

 Djibouti: Leverage Is Built, Not Given

Djibouti provides an important counterexample—but the usual reading overstates the role of its current strategic indispensability.

Djibouti’s dispute with DP World did not begin in today’s crowded strategic landscape. The original port relationship was formed earlier, when France was the dominant external military power and Djibouti’s geopolitical weight was far smaller. The 2017 decision to terminate the Doraleh Container Terminal concession and take control of the facility was therefore not simply a product of multi-power indispensability. It was an assertion of sovereign control over a strategic asset, made before all the consequences could be known. Those consequences were serious. 

In January 2022, an LCIA award ordered Djibouti to pay approximately $148.2 million plus interest for breach; subsequent proceedings addressed enforcement and other aspects of the dispute. A later 2025 arbitration decision found Port de Djibouti SA itself was not liable for DP World's loss of the contract, while the dispute with the government continued. (Jus Mundi). Djibouti therefore neither simply defeated DP World nor simply lost. It demonstrated that a small state can exercise political control over a strategic asset even when doing so carries significant legal and financial consequences. Its ability to absorb those consequences was reinforced by what Djibouti became over time. Djibouti sits beside the Bab el-Mandeb and hosts major foreign military facilities, including the principal U.S. military installation in Africa, China’s first overseas military base, and French and Japanese military presences. It is also the principal maritime gateway for Ethiopia. These multiple relationships create bargaining power: the United States, China, France, Japan and Ethiopia all have major interests in Djibouti, while Djibouti benefits from maintaining relationships with each of them.

The lesson is not that international law is irrelevant. It is that law is most effective when supported by strategic leverage. Sovereignty is easier to defend when several powerful actors have an interest in preserving a state’s autonomy. But Djibouti’s case adds a further point: the leverage was not simply given by geography. Djibouti did not merely convert location into power. It built power around geography over time—and then used that accumulated power to defend a sovereign choice it had made earlier. Leverage is built, not given.

 Eritrea: The Risks of Dependence

Eritrea illustrates the opposite problem.

During the Yemen war, the UAE and its Saudi-led coalition partners used Eritrea’s Assab as a strategic staging point for military operations. Crisis Group documented Assab’s role as an air-sea logistics base and later documented the UAE’s withdrawal as its military posture in Yemen changed. (International Crisis Group)

The arrangement reflected a straightforward bargain: Eritrea possessed geography; the UAE possessed capital, logistics and military capabilities.

For as long as their interests converged, the relationship was mutually useful.

But it also demonstrated the vulnerability inherent in patron-client relationships. A state that depends heavily on one external power has limited bargaining power when that power’s priorities change.

The broader lesson is structural: *A patron’s commitment is rarely unconditional. It lasts for as long as strategic interests converge* .

 Somaliland and Ethiopia: Investment Meets Maritime Strategy

Somaliland presents a more complex case because its objective is not simply economic development. It seeks international recognition.

Berbera became central to that strategy because infrastructure and international commercial partnerships could increase Somaliland’s geopolitical relevance.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland on December 26, 2025, further altered the strategic environment. Israel became the first country to formally recognize Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state. Somalia rejected the move, while the African Union reaffirmed its support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. (Reuters)

Recognition did not resolve Somaliland’s international position. Instead, it placed the territory even more firmly within competition surrounding the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

Berbera now sits at the intersection of maritime security, Ethiopia’s search for alternative maritime access, Somalia’s territorial claims, Somaliland’s search for recognition, Gulf competition, Israeli strategic interests and the wider contest around the Bab el-Mandeb.

The UAE did not create Somaliland’s political aspirations or Somalia’s territorial claim. But Emirati investment gives it influence over one of the most strategically valuable assets in the dispute.

That is *transactional power.* 

Ethiopia’s position is equally important.

Landlocked since Eritrea’s independence, Ethiopia depends overwhelmingly on the Djibouti corridor. The World Bank states that more than *95 percent of Ethiopia’s import-export trade by volume* uses the Addis-Djibouti corridor. (World Bank)

This dependence gives Djibouti leverage while creating a powerful Ethiopian incentive to diversify its maritime options.

The January 2024 Ethiopia-Somaliland memorandum of understanding demonstrated how quickly a commercial question could become a regional security issue. Ethiopia presented the agreement as a framework for securing access to the sea; Somalia rejected it as a violation of its sovereignty.

The UAE occupies an important position within this changing architecture because its relationships extend across several of the actors involved.

Abu Dhabi officially describes Ethiopia as a strategic partner and says it has provided support worth $3 billion, including $2 billion in direct investment and a $1 billion deposit in Ethiopia’s central bank. Those are official UAE figures. (UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Its influence therefore derives not simply from individual assets, but from *connecting assets and relationships into a regional network* .

 Sudan: When Transactional Power Becomes Dangerous

Sudan represents the most serious test of this model.

Since war erupted in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, the UAE has faced persistent allegations that it has supported the RSF. Sudanese diplomatic communications to the United Nations have repeatedly made such allegations.

Those documents establish the existence of the allegations, but they do not independently prove them.

The publicly reported body of evidence has nevertheless expanded considerably.

Sudan instituted proceedings against the UAE before the International Court of Justice on March 5, 2025, alleging violations of the Genocide Convention in connection with Darfur. On May 5, the Court rejected Sudan’s request for provisional measures and removed the case from its General List because it lacked jurisdiction. The Court therefore did not adjudicate the underlying allegations on their merits. (ICJ)

That distinction is crucial.

A lack of jurisdiction is not a finding that the allegations were false, just as the existence of allegations is not proof of every claim.

Independent investigations have nevertheless continued.

A major Financial Times investigation published in August 2026 reported evidence concerning Colombian former soldiers recruited to fight alongside the RSF. It drew on interviews, travel and immigration records, flight information, device-tracking data, photographs, videos, satellite imagery and other documentation. The investigation reported that some Colombian fighters were trained in the UAE and that regional logistics hubs, including Bosaso, were part of the network through which fighters reached Sudan. (Financial Times)

The UAE categorically denied providing military support to either side in Sudan or facilitating mercenary movements. It also disputed allegations concerning the UAE-based security company identified in the reporting. (Financial Times)

The evidence therefore requires careful treatment.

It does not justify presenting every allegation as judicially established fact. But the accumulation of independent reporting, testimony and documentary evidence makes alleged Emirati involvement in Sudan a serious strategic and international-security question rather than something that can simply be dismissed as an unsubstantiated accusation.

The significance goes beyond Sudan.

Security relationships that appear stabilizing in one context can contribute to fragmentation in another. Armed actors may be useful partners in counterterrorism, border security or regime protection while simultaneously undermining state institutions and committing abuses.

The danger is therefore not simply foreign interference.

It is the *privatization and fragmentation of strategic power* .

 From Ports to Networks

Emirati power in the Horn cannot be measured simply by counting ports or military facilities.

The more significant asset is the network connecting them.

Berbera connects maritime infrastructure to Ethiopia. Ethiopia connects the Red Sea to one of Africa’s largest markets. Djibouti connects ports to foreign military powers and Ethiopian trade. Sudan connects Red Sea geography to agricultural, mineral and security interests.

The UAE’s strategic advantage comes from maintaining relationships across several of these nodes simultaneously.

It does not need to control the entire system.

It needs to occupy enough strategic points to influence how the system functions.

That is *network power* .

And network power may be more consequential in the twenty-first century than conventional territorial control.

 The Limits of the “Shadow Empire” Thesis

The term “empire” can be analytically useful as a metaphor for asymmetrical influence, but it can also obscure African agency and exaggerate the coherence of Emirati strategy.

The UAE does not control the Horn. It does not determine the policies of Ethiopia, Somalia, Somaliland, Djibouti or Sudan. Nor are all Emirati investments primarily geopolitical. Some are plainly commercial; others have mixed motives.

The UAE itself makes this argument. Its Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejects the characterization of its African engagement as an imperial project and emphasizes sovereign partnerships and African agency. (Financial Times)

That counterargument deserves to be taken seriously.

The more defensible proposition is therefore not that Abu Dhabi has established a conventional empire.

It is that the UAE has developed an unusually sophisticated portfolio of relationships in which commercial infrastructure, security cooperation, diplomacy and political influence can reinforce one another. *An empire imposes.* *A network bargains.* *The UAE’s model is closer to the latter.* 

 Local Agency—and Unequal Bargaining Power

African governments are not passive victims.

They negotiate, bargain, exploit rivalries, seek investment, pursue security partnerships and deliberately invite external powers into their territory when doing so strengthens their position.

Djibouti has turned its geography into national leverage by hosting competing foreign powers. Somaliland has used Berbera to increase its international visibility. Ethiopia is seeking alternatives to its dependence on a single maritime corridor.

These are rational strategies.

But bargaining power is not distributed equally.

A small state may negotiate the terms of a concession, while a much larger financial or military power may possess greater capacity to wait, invest, retaliate or offer alternatives.

Transactional sovereignty can therefore produce unequal bargains even when both sides formally consent.

The relationship is not simply: _UAE → victim_ 

It is: _UAE → bargain → local political interests → strategic dependency_ 

The asymmetry lies in the bargaining power.

 The Real Test of Sovereignty

The Horn of Africa is a case study in the transformation of sovereignty itself.

Formal sovereignty remains intact. Governments retain flags, borders, constitutions and diplomatic recognition. But the practical capacity to exercise sovereign choices increasingly depends on access to capital, security partners, markets and strategic alternatives.

A state may be legally sovereign while economically dependent. It may be politically independent while militarily dependent. It may formally control a port while relying on a foreign company to operate it. It may reject a foreign patron while discovering that it has few alternatives.

Sovereignty can therefore survive formally while becoming increasingly conditional in practice.

The cases examined here reveal different dimensions of that problem.

 *Djibouti* demonstrates how strategic power around geography can become over time.

 Eritrea demonstrates the risks of dependence on a narrow external partnership.

 Somaliland demonstrates how investment and strategic access can generate both opportunity and dependence.

 Ethiopia demonstrates how maritime vulnerability can reshape regional diplomacy.

 Sudan demonstrates the catastrophic consequences when external security relationships become entangled with internal war.

Together, these cases reveal a broader transformation.

The Horn of Africa is becoming a laboratory for geopolitical competition in which ports, military facilities, logistics corridors, political alliances and financial relationships are increasingly interconnected.

The UAE has been exceptionally effective at operating within this environment, but it is not the sole author of the system.

The system is produced by the interaction of Gulf ambitions, great-power competition, African state strategies, economic dependence and weak regional institutions.

The answer, therefore, cannot simply be to condemn the UAE.

The deeper solution is to give Horn states more strategic alternatives: diversified financing, more trade corridors, stronger regional institutions, greater transparency in port and military agreements, clearer rules governing foreign security assistance, and stronger mechanisms for holding external actors and local partners accountable when strategic partnerships contribute to armed conflict or serious human-rights abuses.

The objective should not be to prevent foreign investment or exclude Gulf states, China, the United States, Turkey or Europe from the region.

It should be to ensure that foreign engagement *strengthens sovereignty rather than substituting for it* .

That is the real test of the rules-based order: not whether international law can articulate principles, but whether those principles can constrain power when doing so becomes inconvenient.

In the Horn of Africa, that test is becoming increasingly difficult.

The question is no longer simply whether the rules-based order is fraying.

It is whether small states can still defend their sovereignty *without having to make themselves indispensable to someone else’s strategic interests.* 

........

 *Source Notes* 

1. *UAE–Africa engagement* : UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement published by the Financial Times. The investment figures are official UAE claims. (Financial Times)

2. *Berbera* : DP World documentation establishes the concession, investment and development of the port and economic zone. (DP World)

3. *Djibouti–DP World* : Arbitration records establish the legal dispute and the 2022 award of approximately $148.2 million plus interest. (Jus Mundi)

4. *Ethiopia–Djibouti* : World Bank data establishes that more than 95% of Ethiopia’s import-export trade by volume uses the Addis-Djibouti corridor. (World Bank)

5. *Somaliland recognition* : Reuters reported Israel’s December 2025 recognition and the subsequent regional reaction. (Reuters)

6. *Ethiopia–UAE* : UAE government figures on the $3 billion support and investment package. (UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

7. *Sudan/ICJ* : The ICJ's case record establishes the proceedings, jurisdictional decision and removal of the case from the General List. (ICJ)

8. *Sudan/Colombian fighters* : The Financial Times investigation provides the principal independent reporting cited here, alongside the UAE's response and denials. (Financial Times)

9. *Assab* : International Crisis Group documented the UAE and coalition use of Assab during the Yemen conflict. (International Crisis Group)